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Good news—Farmers respond to incentives. 
Bad news—Farmers respond to incentives. 
 
Introduction 
The title of this presentation implies that private choice and public concern are not 
always the same and that there is a role for insurance companies to make private 
choices more attuned to public concerns.  We have heard from previous speakers in this 
session how private markets and private insurance innovations can internalize 
externalities (Skees) and reduce obstacles for adoption of improved practices (Cubie). 
 
Private markets can efficiently allocate the costs of public good (the reduction of 
atmospheric CO²) between alternative systems of reduced emission or sequestration.  
Cubie has explained how win-win situations can be created between agricultural 
producers and environmental concerns with the substitution of financial risk instruments 
for potentially adverse, physical inputs like fertilizer, pesticides, herbicides, and tillage 
(increased soil erosion).  Some of these potentially injurious inputs are applied in greater 
amounts for contingent effects (risk).  These environmentally sensitive inputs can be 
reduced with minor yield impacts on average and a portion of the resultant input cost 
savings can be used to fund insurance that indemnifies when the adverse contingency 
occurs.  The producer has lower costs and as an extra benefit less load is put on the 
environment.  In this presentation, I would like to explore how the insurance mechanism 
can be used to change the economic playing field such that public and private goals are 
on the same side.  
 
The Company’s Role 
Insurance companies are financial institutions that traditionally administer the payment of 
claims under contractual terms (i.e., insurance policies) from pools of accumulated 
financial resources mostly gathered from policyholders.  Insurance companies pool risk.  
Risks are taken only to the extent that there remains some volatility in the expected 
results of the risk pools.  Increasingly, insurance companies are being called upon to 
take on more systemic risks.  They are also evolving into multi-faceted risk management 
institutions that bundle and package various risk management services, information, and 
risk transfer services.  An insurance company quantifies risks, diagnose causes of 
losses, indemnify insured losses, collect information, and monitor results.  With 
contractual investigative power, insurance companies are unique partners in the 
business world.  
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1 Steven C. Griffin, Vice President of Strategic Analysis, IGF Insurance Company, Des Moines, IA.  Paper 
presented at the Agricultural Outlook Forum 1999, Arlington, VA, February 22-23, 1999.  All comments 
and opinions provided is solely the author’s and do not necessarily represent the opinions or positions of 
IGF Insurance Company, its management, or stockholders. A Level Playing Field 
To illustrate my point, I would like to use the analogy of a playing field in a field sport like 
football or soccer, and maybe hockey.
2  In the era of domed stadiums, perfect grass, and 
laser-leveled playing fields, the significance of the playing field advantage is sometimes 
forgotten.  On those fields of football, the initial flip of the coin decides who chooses who 
will take first offense (receiving team) versus first defense (kicking team), a strategic 
decision.  The choice of which goal or endzone to defend is inconsequential.  There are 
those games, when the wind is howling through the goal posts or one end is flooded that 
the choice makes a difference.  Yet one also knows that the sides will be switched 
before the game is over.  However, in the much different game where business survival 
is the goal, the side taken initially on the playing field can determine the outcome.  The 
deciding team is not guaranteed the opportunity to play long enough to switch sides. 
  
In these economic games, the playing field is also seldom fixed.  Changing the playing 
field during the game can be as much as part of the game as the strategies actually 
played on the field.  Although games can be won in an uphill fight, the victories are less 
than on a level field.  Having the downhill advantage makes the win easier and quicker. 
 
Observers of these games sometimes do not see the relative level of the playing field.  It 
is as if they view it from the Goodyear blimp above---what may appear fairly flat can be 
highly pitched in a certain direction.  The pitch may only be discernible as we watch the 
play and notice the way the ball rolls or how play is concentrated in a certain portion of 
the field.  We may have thought the game was rigged to go one direction only to find the 
game going the other way.  The answer lies in that the playing field is more than one 
facet deep. 
 
The Three R’s 
What makes a field level or pitched depends upon three accumulating layers---the three 
R’s---Rules, Revenues, and Risk.  Each of these levels is not uniform across the field 
and most times favor one endzone or goal over the other.  Taken together the pitch of 
one can be enhanced or reversed by another layer.  This is not a game of paper, 
scissors, and rock.  If only one layer is viewed or considered, the advantageous goal 
may not be obvious. 
 
Rules 
Rules or regulatory controls can determine a game.  As a matter of public policy, rules 
are sometimes designed to be uniform and level.  Equal protection under the law, civil 
rights, and anti-trust are examples of field leveling rules.  Other rules, like affirmative 
action, zoning, shipping preference, etc. pitch the field toward public goals.  Some rules 
like prohibitions try to stop play altogether by creating a very steep slope or create out-
of-bounds lines.  Rules and regulations are relied upon to modify the game’s outcome 
that otherwise might occur.  But rules are not all powerful.  They generally require 
voluntary compliance in order to be efficient and effective.  Seldom is there enough 
police power if the other layers are strongly adverse.  For example, the production, 
distribution, and use of illegal drugs continue despite a multitude of laws and rules and 
considerable police efforts---the revenue and risk layers offset the rule.  Rules can be 
clearly advantageous and still not followed even with full knowledge and education.  How 
                                                           
2 Of course, in this illustration of using a playing field, there are only two goals, one more advantageous 
than the other.  In reality, there can be multiple goals in multiple dimensions.  
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 else do you explain people who speed in traffic, smoke, overeat, or never exercise.  
They all know better. 
 
Revenues 
Economic incentives are powerful.  Expected revenues, costs, and returns favor one 
production technique, product, or consumptive practice over another.  Of course, 
economists would say that the give and take of supply and demand, production and 
consumption, would eventually reach an equilibrium in which everything is equal and our 
playing field level.  I would say economic adjustments move us in the direction of 
equilibrium but before we get there something happens and the playing field tilts again.  
Suffice to say if you do not understand why things are the way they are—you can use 
that famous still-unidentified Washingtonian’s advice of 25 years ago—“follow the 
money”.  Consumers reward producers that satisfy their wants and needs with 
exchanges of money.  Producers reward their input suppliers and factors of production 
(labor, capital, land, and natural resources) similarly.  Consumers sell their owned 
factors of production in order to buy what they want or need.   Economic revenues are 
tilted toward products and services desired by the consumer directly or indirectly. 
 
As a matter of public policy, we have pitched the revenue layer with all sorts of slanted 
revenues.  Differential taxation and subsidies attempt to tilt the revenue layer one way or 
another.  These are effective but can be very costly. 
 
Risk 
The final determining layer is probably the one most overlooked.  If the rules are 
supportive and the economics advantageous for the goal---why isn’t team playing on that 
end of the field?  As we have heard today, the answer is risk.  Risk is the third layer.  
Aversion to risk and the inability to take certain risks can negate the other two layers.  
Insurance and other risk management strategies do allow the risk layer to be trimmed at 
the expense of some of the revenue layer.  Risk can also be transferred to the public 
and the layer flattened.  Examples of these strategies are the federal crop insurance 
program, the federal flood insurance program, loan guarantees through FSA, import-
export bank, and others.  
 
Private Choice versus Public Choice 
In most cases, the public choice wins when the (private) team with the field advantage 
wins, because the public built the arena in the first place.  The winning team is producing 
a product or service that the public wants.  The desires of the consumer pitch the field in 
favor of that goal with revenue.  Rules are generally are neutral and the risks are normal 
and acceptable (level) with revenues.  But what if the public choice is not aligned with 
the incentives faced by the private sector?  As we have already alluded, there are 
various tools that can slant the winning team toward the public goal.  New rules or 
regulatory edicts can be rendered, but individual freedom and empowerment suffers.  
Subsidies and cost sharing can change the economics, but may distort markets and 
optimum resource use.  Guarantees and public insurance can be issued, but more risk 
rather than less can result.  The question is which is most effective, which is most 
acceptable, and which is most efficient.  I prefer private decision-making for public 
choices rather than public decision-making for private choice.  Private decision-making is 
a skill and a resource we should not allow to languish or go undeveloped. 
 
___________________________ 
1999 Steven C. Griffin 
  Page 4 of 6 A Family Example Using Insurance 
The Griffin family has currently two underage male drivers.  Automobile transportation is 
a modern day necessity and insurance is mandatory.  How does the family (public) goal 
of safe driving and low cost transportation equate with the sons’ (private) propensity for 
speeding and accidents.  Parental rules (Rule layer) are largely ineffective a priori due to 
out-of-sight, out-of-mind consciousness and state laws against child abuse.  Risk is 
equally unappreciated---no one expects to get caught or accidents happen to him or her.  
The determining layer is economic and insurance causes the slant.  Mom and Dad pay 
for the vehicles, but the sons’ pay for their insurance costs and fines.  Excessive 
speeding tickets provide both direct and indirect (higher insurance rates) economic 
disincentives. Accidents similarly have economic consequences.  Plus, older four-door 
sedans are much more acceptable, good grades lower insurance rates, and the 
insurance company is both monitor and executioner.  Of course, no insurance company 
can take over your parenting, but it can tilt the playing field and empower independent 
decisions that support the common (family) goal.   
 
An Agricultural Example – Bt Refuge Management 
There is a current controversy concerning the renewal or permanent registration of 
transgenic seedstock expressing the Bt insecticide.  Organic farmers and environmental 
groups are concerned that the widespread adoption of Bt-technology in field crops will 
create resistant insects and render useless a powerful insecticide for which organic 
farmers have few, if any, substitutes.  Major field crop seed providers see Bt-crops as a 
major bio-technological innovation that provides significant positive economic returns to 
producers.  Bt-varieties, under conditional approval, have been widely accepted with a 
50 percent market penetration in only three crop years since introduction. 
 
One major method to manage (i.e., delay) Bt insect resistance is through establishment 
of nearby non-Bt insect refuges.  The idea being that any resistant insect that might 
emerge from Bt acres would mate with susceptible insects from nearby refuges with 
overwhelming probability.  NC-205 entomologists have reached a consensus and the 
seed industry has agreed that a 20 percent, untreated refuge should suffice for Bt-corn.  
The seed industry proposes to require farmers purchasing Bt-corn to plant the 20% 
refuge to non-Bt corn via grower agreements made at time of purchase---the rule layer.  
The revenue layer of the playing field is advantage 100% Bt-corn and no refuge.  The 
risk of significant yield loss to untreated refuge acres to corn borer is also high---
advantage 100% Bt-corn and no refuge.  Furthermore, with multiple suppliers of Bt-corn, 
a producer can easily purchase 100% of his needs in Bt corn.  Plus, the industry’s 
proximity requirement is county based and not easily tracked.  Looking at this playing 
field, there is obvious reason to suspect that the team for resistance management will 
have an uphill fight.  While many farmers will dutifully obey the rules, the economics are 
potentially overwhelming. 
  
However, an insurance program might be able to level the revenue playing field.  If an 
insurance policy could indemnify the refuge acres to the same benefit level as the Bt 
corn protects the Bt acres from insect damage, the incentive not to plant refuge acres 
would be removed.  The insurance coverage would only provide such benefits if the 
refuge were sufficiently large and proximate to the Bt acres to satisfy the resistance 
management plan.  The cost of the refuge insurance would be borne in the seed cost of 
the Bt. Therefore, the producer in compliance with the resistance management program 
would receive extra benefits at least equal to the economics provided by non-
compliance.  The refuge insurance policy would also provide greater benefits in heavy 
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layer).  In addition, the insurance administration would document compliance and non-
compliance by a non-seed third party.  Of course, this insurance solution would cost 
some administrative costs that would lower the net returns to Bt-users and technology 
owners in the short run.  On the other hand, reduced returns in the short run may be 
made up in the long run by increasing the business life of the Bt technology and as a 
reasonable defense against those who desire outright prohibition of the technology.    
 
Conclusion 
Private and commercial decisions are influenced by the cumulative effects of three 
underlying layers---economic revenues, regulatory rules, and risk.  The playing field on 
which private and commercial decisions are made can be slanted advantageously 
toward certain goals.  Private choice can be steered toward public goals through 
changes in any of the three layers.  Reliance on a single layer does not insure success.  
Insurance and other risk management vehicles can be developed that change the slope 
of the revenue and risk layers in order to encourage private choice for public concerns.  
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